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CIVIL PROCEDURE REFORM IN JAPAN
Takeshi Kojima*
I. INTRODUCTION
Delay in court has been a problem common in all eras, both an-
cient and modem, and to all systems of law, Western and Eastern
alike. In Japan, however, the problem is arguably more acute. The
average delay between filing and judgment for cases that require at
least a minimum level of proof-taking or an evidentiary hearing is 27
months.I Far longer delays are experienced before final judgment if an
appeal is made.
2
The typical civil case proceeding through litigation will be heard
before a career judge without a jury.3 On average, each case will have
seven oral hearings, two settlement hearings, and four party or witness
examination sessions. In the average case, little more than 3 witnesses
are examined for a total of 4 hours.4 The average time spent between
sessions is 40 days. However, evidentiary hearings can be scheduled
only once every 75 days. Moreover, in half of all cases the judge is
moved to another jurisdiction and replaced due to Japan's system of
rotating judges to serve in different jurisdictions.
This deplorable reality has recently led to renewed efforts to tackle
the problem of delay in Japan. Two groups that have been particu-
larly important in this effort are two local bar associations and the
* Director of the Institute of Comparative Law in Japan, Chuo University. Doctor of Laws,
Chuo University (1978) and Resident Scholar, University of Michigan Law School (1966-68).
1. The Japan Federation of Bar Associations, Kokumin no Saiban wo Ukeru Kenri (3), in
THE 11TH SHIHO SYMPOsIUM RECORD 30 (1987). This contrasts with judicial statistics from
1988 which show the average time taken for the disposition of cases filed at the district court was
12 months. The Supreme Court Jimusokyuoku Minjikyoku (General Secretarial Civil Depart-
ment) Syowa 63 Nendo Minji liken no Gaiky6, 41 H6S6JIH6 2728, 2802 (1988). However, this
official statistic makes no distinction between the types of cases; it is an average of all cases filed,
including those that lead to default judgment and those that are promptly settled.
2. In cases where the claim is less than or equal to Y900,000, the summary court has juris-
diction with appeal to the district court and then to the high court. For cases over Y900,000, the
appropriate forum is the district court with appeal to the high court, and from there to the
Supreme Court. The first appeal is for reviewing fact and law; the second appeal is for reviewing
only law.
It is noteworthy that, with the exception of a two week time limit and penalties for abusive
appeal, there is no limitation on appeals. MINSOH6 (Code of Civil Procedure), at arts. 366, 384
and 396 (Japan).
3. The basic structure of Japanese civil procedure is similar to the European continental
style, particularly that of West Germany.
4. The Japan Federation of Bar Associations, supra note 1, at 30.
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Tokyo and Osaka district courts. The First Tokyo Bar Association
and the Second Tokyo Bar Association have each separately published
their own recommendations as to how to remedy the situation.5 The
First Tokyo Bar Association's publication, entitled "A Tentative Draft
of a New Civil Procedure Law," is a radical proposal, while the Sec-
ond Tokyo Bar Association's proposal is more or less similar to the
more moderate proposals of the Tokyo and Osaka district courts.
These proposals are particularly noteworthy because they represent a
change of heart by the two bar associations. Like some of the other
bar associations in Japan, they were not supportive of attempts at pro-
cedural reform in the past.
In 1987, the Tokyo and Osaka District Courts, two of the leading
courts in Japan, each published their own prescription for reform6 and
have actually put many of their suggestions into practice. It should be
noted that there is a subtle difference in the language that the bar as-
sociations and the courts each use to characterize the goal of reform.
While the bar associations use the phrase "a faster disposition of
cases,",7 8 the courts have called for "a higher quality of hearing."9
This difference in terminology is understandable in light of the fact
that the Chief Justices of the Supreme Court have for a number of
years repeatedly called for speedier hearings, while the bar associa-
tions have resisted reform in that direction.. Consequently, the courts
have attempted to avoid a confrontation with the bar by using more
neutral terminology in their proposals.
Because of the important role the bar and judiciary play in build-
ing a faster procedural mechanism, reform should be approached in a
spirit of cooperation between the two groups. Although in the past
the judiciary and the bar have been on different sides of the debate on
procedural reform, they have now, for the first time, come to share a
common ground in their approach, thus making the future of reform
brighter.
This article will describe and evaluate these recent proposals for
reform and conclude that the legal community should experiment with
5. Daiichi Tokyo Bengoshikai (First Tokyo Bar Association), Shin-minjisoshd Tetsuzuki
Shian, 914 JURIST 40 (1988); Daini Tokyo Bengoshikai (Second Tokyo Bar Association),
MINJISOSH6 JuirTsu SOKUSHIN JISSEN MANUAL SHIAN (1989).
6. Tokyo Chih6 Saibansho (Tokyo District Court), Minjisoshi no Shinri wo Jujitsu Saseru
tameno Tokyo Chihdsaibansho no Hdsakuan, 914 JUIST 32 (1987); Osaka Chih6 Saibansho
(Osaka District Court), Minjisoshd no Shinri wo Jujitsi Saseru tameno.Osaka Chihdsaibansho no
Hdsakuan, id. at 35.
7. Some members of the bar have recognized the need for speedy hearings, but have insisted
that the only method employed should be to increase the number of judges and assistant judges.
8. Daiichi Tokyo Bengoshikai, supra note 5, at 45,.
9. Tokyo Chih6 Saibansho, supra note 6, at 36.
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the suggested procedural changes. The constitutional, procedural and
social implications of the innovative methods will also be considered.
II. A NEW STIMULUS TOWARD REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
There are several factors behind the new movement to reform civil
procedure in Japan. One directly influential factor has been the new
civil procedure reforms in West Germany, the country which provided
the model for Japanese procedural law. In addition, the reforms and
lively debate that have taken place in other civil law jurisdictions, such
as France, and in the common law countries of England and the
United States, have had a significant impact in Japan. However, the
international reform movement has its roots not just in changing legal
fashions, but in more fundamental structural causes. Increasingly,
countries have recognized that speedy and efficient deliberation and
judgment of the issues in a case is a fundamental procedural right.' 0
This recognition goes so far as to conceive of an international mini-
mum standard to be followed in each case and is beginning to provide
us with a new yardstick with which to measure the fairness and qual-
ity of the particular procedural system in each country.
Another impetus for reform indirectly comes from ordinary citi-
zens and the corporate sector. Citizens who became involved in the
consumer and environmental litigation of the 1960s and 1970s I I began
to exert pressure for reform by relaying their criticisms of the legal
system through their lawyers. Also, as many companies and busi-
nesses have begun to form large corporate law departments with ex-
tensive workloads, they have come to realize that there is a significant
gap between the dynamic needs of business and the plodding world of
law. Hence, threatened with the "bengoshi banare" (disgruntled cli-
ents deserting the use of lawyers), lawyers have had to deal with and
account for the criticisms aired by their private and corporate clients.
This pressure has shaped their attitudes toward reform. 12
10. A speedy hearing is guaranteed by constitutional provisions in Spain, Turkey and South
American countries. Such guarantees can also be read through the interpretation of constitu-
tional law in Japan, West Germany, the United States and Greece. In some countries, such as the
Netherlands, a speedy hearing is provided for in the procedural law. FUNDAMENTAL GUARAN-
TEES OF THE PARTIES IN CIVIL LITIGATION (M. Cappelletti & D. Talon eds. 1973); Schwab &
Gottwald, Verfassung und Zivilproze, in EFFECTIVENESS OF JUDICIAL PROTECTION AND CON-
STITUTIONAL ORDER 1, 63-66 (W. Habscheid ed. 1983); Kojima, Judicial Protection of Human
Rights, in WORLD CONGRESS ON PROCEDURAL LAW FOR THE NINTH CENTENARY OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA, JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 281, 314-315 (1988).
11. Various consumer and environmental litigation in Japan is described in PERSPECTIVES
ON LITIGATION AND ADR: JAPAN AND THE U.S.A. (T. Kojima ed. 1990).
12. The Japanese Federation of the Bar has regularly held a symposium entitled "Towards a
Populist Lawyer" since 1985. I had the pleasure of delivering the key-note address to the first,
1220 [Vol. 11:1218
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Courts have not been immune from actual and anticipated pres-
sures either. Recently, there has been a phenomenal increase in litiga-
tion. While many of the new cases are simple or undisputed credit
cases, the proportion of complex cases in which difficult scientific
proof is required or multiple parties are involved has increased, adding
to the workload of the courts. The courts anticipate that as Japanese
society becomes more individualistic, there will be a rise in the number
of complex cases. The pressures resulting from such an increase will
inevitably have a significant impact on both the bar and judiciary.
Finally, with the increasing globalization and internationalization
of Japan, many Japanese lawyers specializing in foreign or interna-
tional law who have been exposed to more efficient procedural systems
in other countries have come to realize that Japan has an acute delay
problem. Similarly, with the international community's increased
contact with Japan's legal system, foreigners have begun to focus on
the faults of Japanese procedural law. Japanese lawyers have thus
seen the need to renovate the legal machinery and discard their tradi-
tional negative attitudes towards reform.
III. A SKETCH ON THE NEW REFORM MODEL
Although there have been many previous reforms and reform pro-
posals, the present proposals by the bar associations and the Tokyo
and Osaka district courts are unique in that they go beyond piecemeal
reform' 3 and envisage a thorough and complete reform of Japanese
civil procedure and practice. The basic element underlying these pro-
posals is the idea of a three-session hearing for the average case in
litigation. They provide for the implementation and support of the
three-session model. The following is a description of the features un-
derlying these new reform proposals.
14
A. The First Session
The first session should, in principle, be held as early as practica-
ble. It serves two main functions. First, at this session the court has
the opportunity of weeding out those cases that do not involve a dis-
fourth and sixth symposia. The organization's extraordinary enthusiasm is motivated by a sense
of urgency, largely due to the thought that citizens may soon start deserting lawyers.
13. Several of the reforms that have been implemented include the active use of the prepara-
tory conference, MINSOH6 (Code of Civil Procedure) art. 249 (Japan); preparatory oral hearings
in open court, Minjisosh6 Kisoku (Civ. P. Ct. R.) 26 (Japan); penalties for abusive appeals,
MINSOH6 art. 384, para. 2, and summary procedure for bill and check litigation, MINSOH6 art.
444. Various other reforms have been advocated by judges, lawyers and scholars.
14. Here I follow the new model as summarized in Takeshita, Minjisosh5 no Kaizen to
Aratana Shinrimoderu no Masaku, 40 JiYO TO SEIGI 95 (1989).
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pute, i.e., cases that cAn be disposed of by default judgment, cases
where one of the parti8 (usually the defendant) does not appear, or
cases where setvice of ihe complaint has been by public notice.' 5 , The
court then categorizesthe remaining cases according to whether they
are appropriate for mediation ,or settlement in court, whether they re-
quire a preparatory conference or informal hearing and whether- they
will have a public hearing. In making such a categorization, the court
is to look at, inter alia; the parties' expectation and any negotiations
that may have.take4 place between the parties prior- to the case.
Second, during this session the court should attempt.to clariOy the
issues and allegations involved-in the case and also make preliminafy
arrangements for the evidence to.be presented in later sessions. This is
undertaken so"s tQo ensure the efficient progress of later sessions..
Before the first session, theplaintiff submits a complaint which, in
order to facilitate carefil delibe ration of the issues, must clearly .state
the causes of action upon which the plaintiff is suing and the facts
from which the allegations arise. '
At this first session, the court prepares those cases that contain an
element of dispute for later sessions by instructing parties to clarify
certain matters or to make preparations to do so. Parties are also en-
couraged to submit documentary evidence. Parties, usually defend-
ants, who have not prepared sufficiently for the case are encouraged or
- if necessary - ordered to prepare.
B. The Second Session
Between the first and second sessions an exchange of briefs takes
place. At this time the court makes an effort at clarifying the matter
and comes to an understanding of what is at the core of the dispute.
The preparation for the second session takes between two to three
months.
At the second session, the court examines documentary evidence
and decides whether witnesses will be examined and the order in
which they will be examined. All orders and dispositions that need to
be made to secure the attendance of witnesses are made at this stage.
The procedure for the second session is a form of hearing designed
to prepare the parties for efficient proof-taking. The primary method
of examination is that of an informal "round table" hearing (benron-
ken-wakai), which is radically different from the traditional form of
15. In cases where service of the complaint has been by public notice, the court usually
completes proof-taking and informs the plaintiff when the decision will be rendered. There is no
admission effect in this type of case, due to the lack of advance notice. MINSOHO (Code of Civil
Procedure) art. 140, para., 3 (Japan).
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public oral hearing. The judge, the lawyers and the parties, as well as
those related to the case, such as parents and spouses, attend a confer-
ence in the judge's chambers or in a settlement room in the court. The
atmosphere is informal and the session conducted orally, with the par-
ties communicating directly with the judge. Both sides further elabo-
rate on the facts they have alleged. At all times, the role of the judge is
to assist in the clarification of the evidence that is produced and to get
to the core of the dispute and its detailed factual basis. The judge is
encouraged to convey his opinion of the case to the parties through the
use of his clarification power 16 so that the parties gradually come to an
understanding of the issues as well. Thus, it is hoped that legal and
factual matters can be dealt with in a relaxed manner without the
judge ever assuming an intimidating posture.
At this session, there is often an emphasis on settlement. While
the court is determining and clarifying the issue, it is also making ef-
forts to settle the case. If a general understanding of the case can be
obtained on the basis of documentary evidence alone, the court may
recommend settlement to the parties.
C. The Third Session
At the third and final session, an evidentiary hearing with exten-
sive proof-taking is held before the court. After the witnesses are ex-
amined, both parties present their closing statements. 17 The court
then closes the case, although it has the discretion to order further
sessions if the evidence obtained in the examination is inadequate or if
the issues have not been sufficiently clarified.
The proposals provide that the evidentiary hearing should be con-
ducted as a continuous proceeding to the greatest extent possible, with
minimal interruption. Although a majority of legal opinions agree
that Japan should move towards this more concentrated or continuous
form of hearing, this has not yet been achieved in practice.18
IV. IMPORTANT FEATURES OF THE REFORM MODEL
The foregoing sections described the main thrust of the new model.
In the following section I discuss in greater detail the advisability of
16. Article 127 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides a judge with the power to ask a party
to make his or her allegations clear or suggest the addition of facts, allegations or evidence,
including the modification of pleadings. MINSOH6 (Code of Civil Procedure) art. 127 (Japan).
17. There is still no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure for closing statements, but such
a practice would be useful for injecting life into court hearings.
18. After World War II, there was much procedural modification in favor of an Anglo-
American judicial administration, notably a continuous hearing and cross-examination of
witnesses.
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categorizing cases, the round table discussion, the feasibility of a con-
centrated evidentiary hearing and settlement procedure.
A. The Advisability of Categorizing Cases
All the proposed models provide that, from the earliest stages, the
court should select the most appropriate procedure for the case before
it. 19 Before coming to court, the plaintiff, in all probability, will have
already determined the procedure under which he or she wants to pur-
sue the case, the choice being influenced by prior contact with the de-
fendant. It seems only correct, then, that the court respect the parties'
preferences.
However, the court may still have a large role in determining the
most suitable procedure, as in the case where the parties are unrepre-
sented and have not had legal advice. Even if parties are represented
by counsel, the court may still find additional factors in the case which
make selection of one particular procedure more suitable than others.
The court's neutral position and expertise make it a desirable body for
making such a selection.
Because a lawsuit is dynamic and can develop in diverse ways as it
progresses, the court must pay continuous attention to the develop-
ment of the case and not be too rigid in its choice of procedure if the
proposed categorization of cases is to be most effective. The change of
procedural gear should be a smooth and simple process in order to
facilitate the appropriate selection of process in later stages of a case.
The categorization of cases as advocated by the reform proposals is
an effective measure for diversifying procedure and making use of al-
ternative dispute resolution ("ADR") methods. By matching the sub-
stantive dispute with an appropriate procedure, the categorization of
cases aids in the facilitation of justice. A party is provided with the
most suitable procedure for its case, and the court makes the most
efficient use of its resources.
B. The Round Table Discussion
The Tokyo and Osaka district courts' introduction of the auda-
cious new method of round table discussions into their court practice
represents a significant departure from the traditional form of hearing,
which, as an embodiment of the best elements of modern systems of
19. The First Tokyo Bar Association proposed an early categorization of cases for the reason
that parties take into account the procedure under which they will pursue their case in deciding
whether they want to retain a lawyer. Also, if the case is to be disposed of by settlement, a simple
complaint is all that is required.
1224 [Vol. 11:1218
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procedural law, has long been considered beyond reproach.20
The primary considerations in evaluating the round table approach
are its substantive merit and its practical expediency. Advocates of
the round table discussion characterize this new form of hearing as a
child of judicial wisdom, conceived in the hope of injecting life into
court hearings.2' The traditional form of hearing was similarly born
out of a desire for an active oral presentation, rather than the mere
exchange of briefs and documents. The newer form of hearing there-
fore remains faithful to the spirit of the earlier form.
Supporters argue that round table hearings conducted behind
closed doors would be more participatory and far more likely to result
in a fair settlement. This is because the participants would be more
relaxed and candid, thus enabling the court to reach the heart of the
dispute more easily. They also contend that the round table discussion
would ameliorate the present shortage of court clerks and available
courtrooms because the discussion would be held in the judge's cham-
bers. However, the round table discussion should be adopted for rea-
sons that have more to do with substantive considerations. If
expediency is the paramount consideration, the proposals must be con-
sidered dubious.
Critics of the round table method argue that the traditional
method of open court hearing cannot be discarded simply because the
present methods do not work well.22 They advocate using more ortho-
dox methods to improve the system. In short, they contend that it is
inappropriate to start using the back door instead of repairing the
front door.
Because the round table method has developed out of the daily
experience of the court and is based on a mutual understanding be-
tween the judiciary and the bar,23 there is a certain rationality and
legitimacy behind it. With careful monitoring to determine its merits
and shortcomings, the implementation of this method on an experi-
mental basis is worthwhile. Nevertheless, a one-track experiment in
reform is not sufficient. As the round table method is tested, we
should make efforts to revitalize the traditional hearing in open court
and conform it to the needs of modern Japan.
20. In the traditional system introduced to Japan from Germany in 1891 and 1926, sessions
for oral presentation were held in open court.
21. Suzuki, "Benron Ken Wakai" Hdshiki ni Tsuite, 36 MINJISOSH6 ZASSHI 1 (1990); see
also, Nakano, MINJI TETSUZUKI NO GENZAI MONDA1 57 (1989).
22. Inoue, Shinri no Jujitsu Sokushin to Wakai, 914 JURIST 104 (1988).
23. The Tokyo and Osaka District Courts' proposals were formulated through the process of
joint discussion on various levels among judges and practicing lawyers. MINJISOSH6 NO PRAC-
TICE NI KANSURU KENKYO 8-9 (Institute of Legal Training ed. 1989).
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Essential to the success of the new method is the need to reconcile
it with existing constitutional and procedural law. It may be argued
that the round table discussion has a legitimate basis in procedural law
as a hybrid conference, containing elements of a preparatory confer-
ence in the judge's chambers24 and a hearing in open court.25 What
has been done in chambers is then stated by the judge in court in the
third session, thus creating a legitimate basis for the decision. Even if
we candidly admit that the round table discussion is different from the
traditional device, it can be justified as an expression of the power in-
herent in the judiciary, as long as it is not clearly prohibited by proce-
dural law.
It is more difficult, however, to reconcile properly the round table
discussion with article 82 of the Japanese Constitution which requires
that a judicial hearing be held in "open court. '26 It is questionable
whether the essence of the public hearing requirement can really be
preserved under the proposed reforms. A claim that we have a public
hearing system would be rather hollow if hearings were conducted in
chambers and the results were merely announced in open court.
While it may not be necessary to go as far as to rethink the concept of
a public hearing, we should carefully aim to preserve the essence of the
public hearing requirement by ensuring the parties' active participa-
tion in the third session, either in the opening statement or in the final
argument. The Constitution requires that the essence of the hearing
be public: that focal issues be discussed and evidence be examined.
This constitutional interpretation is faithful to the spirit of the
Constitution.
The First Tokyo Bar Association has proposed a form of hearing
even more radical than the round table discussion method, known as
the "Informal Hearing Session" (shinri kijitsu). According to the pro-
posal, a closed door hearing would be the rule rather than the excep-
tion. Under the scheme, almost every aspect of a court hearing,
including the examination of witnesses, would take place during infor-
mal sessions behind closed doors. This contrasts with the Osaka and
Tokyo district courts' proposal, in which the round table discussion in
the judge's chambers is used only in the second session.
24. MINSOH6 (Code of Civil Procedure) art. 249 (Japan).
25. Minjisosh6 Kisoku (Civ. P. Ct. R.) 26.
26. Article 82 of the Japanese Constitution provides:
Trials shall be conducted and judgment declared publicly. Where a court unanimously de-
termines publicity to be dangerous to public order or morals, a trial may be conducted
privately, but trials of political offenses, offenses involving the press or cases wherein the
rights of people as guaranteed in Chapter III of this Constitution are in question shall al-
ways be conducted publicly.
1226 [Vol. 11:1218
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The First Tokyo Bar Association's proposal attempts to solve the
conflict with Article 82 of the Constitution, the public hearing require-
ment, by allowing the parties themselves to choose whether their hear-
ing will be conducted in chambers or in open court. However, the
parties' consent is simply not sufficient to justify such non-public hear-
ings. In my opinion, the effect of the proposal amounts to an almost
wholesale replacement of the open court hearing.
C. Feasibility of a Continuous Evidentiary Hearing
The concentrated, or continuous, hearing is an evidentiary hearing
that is held over consecutive days until finished. One of the benefits of
a continuous hearing is that the whole process is more visible to the
public, and the enhancement of visibility increases the public's appre-
ciation of events in court and ultimately their confidence in civil
justice.
Present Japanese procedural law provides for a concentrated court
hearing. The practice is embodied in the Civil Procedure Court Rules
which state that: "when issues and evidence have been placed in order,
the hearing in open court of a case should be held continuously to the
greatest extent possible, if such a hearing is to last more than one
day."' 27 The Rules further provide that if such a continuous hearing is
not feasible, "the lapse between sessions should be as short as
possible."
'28
However, the existence of a continuous hearing rule does not nec-
essarily result in an effective hearing in practice. The rule must first be
effectively implemented, and this raises some problems. For example,
when the court schedules a continuous session, a party's or witness'
failure to appear interrupts the court's schedule and results in a con-
siderable loss of time. In a non-continuous hearing this problem can
be more or less absorbed. Under the adversary system, the court may
continue with the proceedings and ultimately render a judgment unfa-
vorable to a non-attending party or to a party whose witnesses have
not appeared. However, in Japan a court may hesitate to do so be-
cause, after calling the witnesses, it implicitly has the responsibility of
ensuring their attendance.2 9 Also, because witnesses are a third party
to the hearing, the parties cannot be punished for their failure to at-
tend. Of course, if a party fails to appear, or if a party scheduled to be
a witness fails to appear, the concept of the adversary system applies,
27. Minjisosh6 Kisoku (Civ. P. Ct. R.) 27 (author's translation).
28. lMt
29. MINSOHO (Code of Civil Procedure) arts. 276-78 (Japan).
1227Summer 1990]
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so that the court may proceed in the party's absence and close the
hearing.30 The court has the ability to minimize absences by encour-
aging parties or their attorneys to cooperate and insure that their wit-
nesses will appear, and if inevitable events prevent witnesses from
attending, attorneys are encouraged to give early notification of non-
attendance.
Another difficulty with the implementation of the continuous hear-
ing is caused by settlements reached on the eve of trial, resulting in
disruption of the court docket. A list of stand-by cases waiting for
hearing that could come on immediately would ameliorate this prob-
lem. However, this would be a difficult practice to implement in Japan
due to a simple lack of cooperation by Japanese lawyers. This lack of
cooperation is caused, in part, by the enormous sacrifices they would
have to make to operate on a stand-by basis. Japan does not use the
jury trial system, and for that reason a continuous hearing is not an
absolute requirement of the Japanese legal system. Therefore, Japa-
nese lawyers have reasoned that the sacrifices to be made in imple-
menting such a hearing do not justify the gains. A second factor is the
small number of lawyers in Japan. Lawyers have such a high propor-
tion of litigated cases on their hands that it would be very difficult for
them to participate in continuous hearings. Third, a continuous hear-
ing would require intensive preparations. To make such preparations
possible, some form of discovery must be made available to lawyers.
In Japan, where there is cross-examination of witnesses but no discov-
ery, 31 we have to find some device to facilitate the continuous hearing.
If, as suggested by the model, evidentiary documents are provided in
early stages of procedure, parties will come to a better understanding
of the case, thus increasing the chances of a successful hearing.
The first Tokyo Bar has advocated the continuous trial, but the
Tokyo and Osaka district courts have been more cautious, a caution
based on the sacrifices that will have to be made if such a hearing is
adopted for all cases. Under the district courts' approach, a continu-
ous hearing would be selectively employed.
There are other innovations contained in the district courts' pro-
posals that need to be examined in the context of the continuous hear-
ing. The courts propose that a party to a case be examined as early as
possible. This is suggested in spite of Article 336 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which states that the court may examine a party after
other witnesses have been examined. The courts make this suggestion
30. MINSOH6 (Code of Civil Procedure) art. 263 (Japan).
31. This aspect of Japanese procedural law is a hybrid of the West German and the Ameri-
can systems. Cross-examination was transplanted from the United States after World War II.
1228 [V/ol. 11:1218
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so that the court and both parties can get an early grasp of the issues
in the case or of the direction of the case. The courts also propose that
the parties and witnesses present statements of the testimony they pro-
pose to give in court before any examination session. Before the hear-
ing commences, the other party can prepare for cross-examination,
thus being able to avoid surprise or postponement.
In my opinion, while a continuous hearing is a good policy in view
of its probable efficiency, decisiveness and high visibility, the court
should retain flexibility over its use. Even if only a minority of cases
are processed this way, the system will be improved to a remarkable
extent.
D. Encouraging a Settlement in Court
The proposals of both bar associations and courts emphasize the
voluntary settlement of disputes in court. They encourage the courts
to take an active role in bringing both parties to settlement. The
Osaka District Court's proposal encourages settlement at any stage of
a case whenever the court feels that a particular compromise is appro-
priate. The proposal further provides that the courts should en-
courage settlement by submitting an opinion or assessment in which
the court indicates a prospective decision whenever it is requested to
do so or feels it is necessary. In exceptional cases, the court may issue
a written opinion proposing concrete terms of settlement. This aspect
is striking in that it gives the court the freedom to express conditions
of settlement that accord with its own view of how a particular case
should be resolved. In this way the court will be able to avoid al-
lowing a settlement that does not correspond to the merits of the case.
The Tokyo District Court's proposals have a similar thrust, emphasiz-
ing settlements that reflect the merits of a case.
It is usually appropriate that the court, in its attempts to bring
about a voluntary resolution of disputes, should form its own opinion
about the conditions of the settlement toward which it is urging the
parties. It is hoped that such an effort by the court will succeed in
bringing about the most appropriate solutions based on fact finding
and legal rules.
However, there are some problems with this heavy emphasis on
settlement. Critics argue that voluntary settlements should be brought
about at the parties' initiative and the parties should play the primary
role. If the judge expresses his own view of the case and his proposals
for settlement, the terms of the settlement will be as inflexible as a
judgment. In effect, the concept of settlement will be little more than a
time-saving device for the court. In my opinion, the criticisms are
Summer 19901 1229
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valid only to some extent. It is certainly problematic if a party feels
pressured by the judge to reach a settlement. More importantly, if the
contents of the settlement agreement are no different from those of a
judgment, the process loses flexibility and becomes valueless as it de-
nies the unique benefits a settlement can bring.
The conditions of settlement should be more or less based on pre-
dicted court decisions consistent with the law, including legal prece-
dent and probable fact-finding. At the same time, a settlement should
maximize the parties' satisfaction through the utilization of creative
ideas. A new negotiation theory suggests that a result consistent with
law but maximizing the parties' satisfaction is negotiated by ascertain-
ing true needs and preferences of the parties and accommodating their
interests.32 This could be called a creative or integrated negotiation
format, as opposed to the traditional adversary format. Although the
result of a settlement may be the same as the judgment that would
have been obtained in court, the contents of the settlement might be
very different. For example, where the enjoyment of an orange is con-
tended by two parties, a judgment rendered according to law would
give both parties one half of the orange. 33 A negotiated settlement,
however, would be able to take into account the use for which each
party desired the orange. A judgment at law would require the equal
division of either the orange or its monetary value. However, it is pos-
sible to reach a settlement that is consistent both with the law and
with the wishes of the parties. Party X takes the orange peel for mak-
ing marmalade and Party Y takes the fruit for relieving thirst. These
are terms that are not possible at law.
3 4
The district courts propose that courts should be selective as to
whether, where and when negotiations for settlement are suitable. This
approach contrasts with the First Tokyo Bar Association's proposal
that an attempt at settlement in every case should be compulsory.
This, I believe, goes too far. As the above example illustrates, if the
courts selectively employ the round table negotiation method, taking
into consideration the desires of each party, successful dispute resolu-
tion can be achieved.
32. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754 (1984); D. PRuirr, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR (1981); H.
RAIFFA, THE ART OF NEGOTIATION (1982); W. ZARTMAN & M. BERMAN, THE PRACTICAL
NEGOTIATOR (1982). See also Kojima, Hdteki Koshd Kenkyui no Genjy6 to Kadai, 381 NBL 12
(1987).
33. MINP6 (Civil Code) art. 250 (Japan).
34. MINPO (Civil Code) art. 258 (Japan).
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V. THE COORDINATION OF PROCEDURES FOR SETTLEMENT
AND JUDGMENT
One of the primary issues of the reform is the coordination of the
settlement procedures with the judgment procedures: should we have
a combined one-track procedure or two separate procedures? Some
interesting opinions and criticisms have been aired on this issue. If a
judgment and settlement are to be consistent, is it advisable to separate
cases into settlement and oral hearing categories at the earliest stages
of the procedure? A possible rationale for the two-track system is that
a hearing session and a settlement session are so completely different
in form, setting and substance that cases must be categorized early.
The critics of the two-track system advocate a single procedure for
settlements and judgments. 3 5 The rationale behind this view is that
rules for judgment and rules for settlement both retain equal flexibil-
ity. Any attempt by the court to distinguish them or characterize them
as different undermines the flexibility.
I agree with this criticism to a certain extent. We often overem-
phasize the differences in rules between judgment and settlement.
Nonetheless the differences do exist. In the reform model, the round
table session serves the dual purpose of facilitating a smooth hearing
and encouraging a settlement. Settlement and judgments are two sep-
arate aspects of a case. Both, as far as procedure is concerned, are
integrated parts. Efforts at judgment and settlement are procedurally
separate but meet together at some point, i.e., at the round table dis-
cussion. In this respect, the reform model has a sound basis.
Another aspect of the relationship of settlement and judgment is
their several related effects. The most fundamental effect is, of course,
actual or possible res judicata, but all possible effects of the hearing
should be considered. If we look at litigation through its various stages
we see that the "litigation effect" (teiso koka) or "confrontation effect"
(taiketsu koka) starts working as soon as the plaintiff submits his com-
plaint. As the hearing moves on, the parties are influenced by the
judge's developing impression of the case. This is the "persuasion ef-
fect" (settoku koka) or "judicial impression effect" (shishokeisei koka).
If the court declares its decision, such a decision has an impact on the
party ("decision effect," or hanketsu koka) even if the decision is not
yet enforceable and an appeal is still possible. Finally, res judicata,
which emerges when an appeal becomes impossible, has a decisive ef-
fect on a party as the end product of civil procedure.
According to the strictly legalist concept of procedure and its ef-
35. Inoue, supra note 21, at 105.
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fects, res judicata is the only effect we should discuss. However, other
forces, i.e. the litigation effect, persuasion effect and decision effect, are
equally important in evaluating the progress of a case. If we take all
effects into account, we have a clearer image of what is actually going
on in court and the forces shaping a settlement. As the sound of the
approaching judgment becomes audible, it is more likely the case will
be settled.
A settlement more or less corresponds to a judge's view of the case
at hand and the legal rules that he will have to apply. In coming to a
settlement, parties will generally take as their starting point the appli-
cable law and the available evidence and then go on to refine and de-
limit the terms of the settlement by appealing to other factors and
conditions. One should not be misled by the process of bargaining
where it appears that there has been little or no effort made to rely on
the merits and relevant rights of the case in support of the offers made,
withdrawn, refused or accepted. Beneath the veneer of negotiation,
there is generally an on-going rational calculation of what the final
outcome should be. The several procedural effects mentioned above
will usually be realized in the settlement negotiation context. There
are, of course, exceptional situations where settlements in court and
judgments bear little relationship to one another. In undertaking pro-
cedural reform, we also have to bear in mind this lack of
relationship. 36
The Tokyo District Court has taken into consideration some of the
more detrimental effects of settlement efforts. As soon as the court
discovers that one or both parties intend to delay judgment by repeat-
edly asking for a settlement session when a settlement appears improb-
able, the court should promptly cease settlement proceedings and
prepare for judgment. This is a cautious measure to prevent a case
from being diverted from the right track.
In order to implement a policy that promotes fair and effective
settlements in the procedural system, a party should have sufficient
36. Exceptional settlements can be divided into two groups. First, some settlements are
achieved because the party has misread the situation or miscalculated the law due to his igno-
rance or unavailability of a lawyer. This kind of settlement is undesirable. The second group are
settlements where the parties are fully aware of the law and of the factual situation but prefer to
settle the case in a way different than that dictated by law and fact, most probably because of the
existence of extra-legal factors, such as humanitarian reasons or perhaps because of a sense of
new or better emerging norms. Eventually such new norms may become accepted by court and
may be incorporated in some way into the law. See also, Kojima, Arbitration System in Japan,
THE INSTITUTE OF COMPARATIVE LAW IN JAPAN, CONFLICT AND INTEGRATION: COMPARA-
TIVE LAW IN THE WORLD TODAY 327, 347 (1989) (discussing the "Planetary System of Justice"
model, in which settlements close to law are near to the center of the galaxy and exceptions are
farther away; this model welcomed the first type of exceptional settlement but certainly did not
exclude the second).
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access to useful and relevant information. The reform model in which
the early production of copies of documentary evidence is encouraged
by the court contributes to the smooth exchange of information, at
least to some extent. However, it is not clear to what extent such "en-
couragement" is effective. In some situations it will not be effective
due to dilatory tactics. In view of this possibility, efforts should be
made to find a way to compel a party to produce the relevant informa-
tion required.37 Devices for a moderate form of discovery should be
introduced to contribute towards fair settlements and concentrated
hearings. This is an important task for the future.
VI. SOME FINAL REMARKS
In this paper, I have discussed several problems relating to the re-
form of civil procedure in Japan. There are still some remaining
problems, such as the relationship between a speedy examination and
a high quality hearing, the advisability of increasing the court's power,
the problem of making the court's opinion easier to understand and
the utilization of new computer technology.
38
Several attempts in the past to achieve speedy justice have proved
to be a failure. In Japan, there is an anxiety about another possible
failure. I believe, however, that the proposed model has great poten-
tial because of its comprehensive nature, its emphasis on case manage-
ment and practice guidelines (improving the legal framework alone
would not be adequate) and building a cooperative work spirit among
judges, clerks and lawyers.
Second, the philosophy and style of the presiding judge, that is,
wisdom (chie), moderation (setsudo) and respect (sonkei), are impor-
tant. Respect toward parties and their lawyers is especially crucial.
Without such a judicious attitude, parties would be reluctant to coop-
erate with the court.
37. At present there are several existing procedures which are of use. Under the Code of Civil
Procedure, a party has the legal right to ask the court to order another party to produce a
document. MiNsoH6 (Code of Civil Procedure) arts. 312-14 (Japan). In the same way, an in.
spection order can be made vis-A-vis property. It should be emphasized that a party or attorney
has the right to demand the production of documents, to inspect property and to examine wit-
nesses to a certain extent, even before a case commences. MINsoHO art. 343. In addition, an
attorney has the right to request a report from a public or private organization with the Bar
Association's permission. Furthermore, in Japan a party or his or her attorney may interview
their witnesses voluntarily. Minjisosh6 Kisoku (Civ. P. Ct. R.) 4-5. It may be possible to
strengthen these rights through judicial interpretation. However, those tools are of limited use in
view of their narrow scope and piecemeal nature.
38. The utilization of new technologies, such as the teleconference or TV conference, would
be useful in making a pre-trial or preparatory conference more efficient and would dispense with
the time-consuming physical movement of parties and lawyers. Such a device would also consid-
erably reduce the parties burden in terms of cost and time.
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Third, court administrators and judges must have confidence in
the procedural reform cause. The popular belief among lawyers, that
speedy examination collides with quality of justice, may work as an
obstacle to reform. A clear understanding of the relationship between
time and quality in judicial proceedings is a valuable asset for the re-
former to have in attempting to overcome this obstacle. Some argue
that a longer examination produces a better judgment. Such an argu-
ment is false: a "reasonable" time produces a better judgment while
an excessively long or short proceeding produces an inferior judgment.
Based on this recognition, reformers are justified in asserting that the
pursuit of a speedy examination also means the pursuit of high quality
justice.
Judicial reform should be explored with procedural principles in
mind, avoiding the inflexibility that comes from insisting on proce-
dural technicalities, but being careful not to disregard broader under-
lying principles. For example, the constitutional mandate of a public
hearing39 enjoys little appreciation as long as the spirit of freedom and
democracy is maintained. Almost no one realizes the true value of the
mandate; it appears to be merely a procedural technicality. However,
the real value of a public hearing is that it is an insurance policy
against possible corruption and tyranny, and only when freedom and
democracy are endangered will the value and meaning of this constitu-
tional guarantee be appreciated. It takes a person with far-reaching
vision to understand and appreciate the true meaning of the guarantee
of a public trial. Procedural reform must be based on such understand-
ing. In the author's view, the essence of the constitutional mandate
"hearing in open court" as provided for in article 82 of the constitu-
tion is found in the debate of focal issues and examination of issues
(proof-taking) in open court. The round table discussion, even behind
closed doors, satisfies this requirement and is thus constitutional.
39. KENP6 (Constitution) art. 82 (Japan).
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